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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the immediate economic and systemic reasons of steadily increasing 
local government indebtedness and investment overheating in China despite central efforts to 
contain them. These two phenomena emerged between 2008 and 2011 as a direct 
consequence of an external shock caused by the global crisis and the subsequent internal 
reaction in the form of intensified stimulating state intervention. New chances for resource 
distribution and investments through state intervention mobilized distribution priorities and 
politically rational economic behavior of actors, characteristic to party-state systems. 
Locations of mobilization were defined by the decentralized Chinese system specifics along 
the intertwined party-state structure. Systemic characteristics and its Chinese specifics 
together resulted in investment overheating, and steadily growing local indebtedness through 
large and state-owned enterprises and local governments. This process was further amplified 
by the characteristics of transforming economy in China as actors in the private sphere were 
mobilized by the increased input demands of those privileged by the systemic priorities of 
state intervention. 
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Introduction 
China’s crisis management between 2008 and 2011 proved to be successful. The national and 
local level responses to the global crisis met the original goals of compensating economic 
decline and decreasing export reliance. Different level governments and banks became 
promptly active, investments accelerated, economic indicators quickly improved, and 
unemployment rate soon dropped to the pre-crisis level. Infrastructural investments at 
prioritized central and western regions skyrocketed, attracting similar growth pace in 
manufacturing sector; moreover, input demands of preferred state owned enterprises activated 
the market field as well.  
However, stimulating state intervention turned into overheating; budgetary 
expenditures increased in enormous pace; legal and illegal land-requisitions and land-use 
sales grew unlimited; expansion of local bank lending became hardly controllable; bad loans 
widely re-emerged; growth of local governments’ indebtedness through fiscal vehicles 
increased steadily; bubbles developed in production and infrastructure-building requiring new 
state intervention. This paper deals with the above economic consequences on national and 
regional level. It argues that though the transformation of the Chinese economy advanced 
substantially towards the market, state intervention activates the characteristics of party-state 
systems and their Chinese specifics. These characteristics will catalyze the translation of 
economically rational goals into politically rational criteria of distribution and similar 
motivations in investment behavior of actors and institutions, both at national and local levels. 
These general and specific Chinese characteristics and according behavior will cause the 
overheating and the local government indebtedness.  
Methodological concerns emerge in the analysis independent of the author’s will. Data 
on investments connected to the stimulus package were not monitored separately. Only its 
elements at different dymensions of the economy may be traced and conjoined. Different 
statistical sources on the same indicator do not overlap. Even macro statistical data of the 
years concerned substantially change retrospectively in more recent publications of the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Severe scientific concerns regarding the reliability of 
such main macroeconomic data as GDP are repeatedly formulated (Rawski, 2001; 2009). 
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Data on local indebtedness containing budgetary and off-budgetary items are not clearly 
discernible on local and national level. I did not have access to individual enterprise level 
census data, neither bank financial enterprise level data for local financial vehicles to 
empirically find out the amassed debts and non-performing loans by these local government 
founded enterprises. Regarding these issues, occasional publications, of nationwide or partial 
deep drilling audits by the National Audit Office on different level governments’ debt at the 
request of the State Council (2010, 2013). In between those occasions data are mostly 
estimations that range extremes.  The main purpose of this paper is not an exact and complex 
statistical analysis of primary data on central sources, loans, debts, inflation, budgetary 
revenues, expenditures, bonds, land use sales, local financial vehicles etc in themselves. 
Neither is willing to analyze separately enterprise and government or bank behavior based on 
those primary data. Instead, both primary data and secondary sources serve together as means 
to interpret developments in the framework of a complex structural, functional, institutional 
and systemic setting. This approach allows us to give a systemic response to repeated 
overheating and steady local indebtedness in China. Next, we shall introduce the sensitivity of 
the Chinese economy to external shocks, its adaptation to those shocks and the economic and 
systemic consequences of that adaptation on national and local levels. 
 
Sensitivity to Global Dynamics 
Finely disaggregated data of 2008-2009 reveal short-lived but dramaticly deep set-back in 
export, import, GDP and Gross Industrial Output Value (GOV) (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
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Figure 1. 
Deep but short set-back in the dynamics of foreign trade 
and fast revival 
 
Source: Michigan University China Data Center http://chinadataonline.org/ 
 
Figure 2. 
Deep but short set-back in the dynamics of GDP and GOV 
and fast revival 
  
 
Source: Michigan University China Data Center http://chinadataonline.org/ 
 
Even yearly dynamics of the same indicators testify for substantial slow down or drop (Table 
1). In 2008, the export growth slowed down to 17.2 percent from 26 percent in 2007, and in 
2009 it precipitated to -16 percent. Meanwhile, by 2008 the GDP growth pace dropped to its 
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two-thirds (from 14.2 percent in 2007 to 9.6) and slightly slowed further in 2009 to 9.2 
percent. The pace of gross industrial output value (GOV) even more radically declined by 
2009 to less than one third of its 2O07 value. Due to shrinking export, the export ratio in the 
GDP steadily declined from 35.2 percent in 2007 to 32.0 in 2008 and 24.1 in 2009  
.  
Percentage 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP y/y 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 
Export y/y 26.0 17.2 -16.0 31.3 20.3 
Export/GDP 35.2 32.0 24.1 26.7 26.1 
GOV y/y 28.0 25.2 8.1 27.4 20.9 
 
Table 1 Main economic indicators from 2007 to 2011 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks; GDP (Index of Gross Domestic Product): China Statistical 
Yearbook 2012, Table 2-4; Export (USD): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 6-3; Export/GDP: 
own calculations based on GDP (yuan; CSY 2012, Table 2-1), export (USD; CSY 2012, Table 6-3; 
and Reference exchange rate of Renminbi to US Dollars (CSY 2012, Table 6-2); GOV: CSY, 2012, 
Table 14-4.  http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
External shock proved to be regionally focussed to coastal provinces due to spatial 
concentration of the above-average Export/GDP (Map. 1). Regional concentration of export in 
2008 attracted 71% of the migrants to the east, while 13.2 percent worked in the central 
provinces and 15.4 in the western provinces
2
. Regional sensitivity to global crisis was 
reflected in the sudden close-down of 600 thousand enteprises by late 2008,
3
 most of them 
small and medium-sized enterprises located in the eastern region (Kong et al. 2009, 237). 
Partly as a result of regionally concentrated close-downs and migrant regional concentration, 
                                                 
2
 For 2009 data, see China Migrants’ Monitoring Report 2009 NBS, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?channelid=33728&record=21 
3
 Data do not only reflect the impact of the global crisis in 2008 but the Labor Law introduced 
in 2007 that required the fulfillment of several obligations to enhance the conditions of 
migrant labor drove many enterprises to close down even before the crisis.  
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16 percent of the 140 million migrants were suddenly laid off between late 2008 and early 
2009 (Chan, 2010, p. 251). 
 
 Map 1. 
Regional distribution of Export/GDP size in 2007  
 
 
 
 
Source:  Michigan University China Data Center http//: chinadataonline.org 
 
Sudden lay-off and its regional and regional-sectoral concentration increased the frequency 
and number of participants of mass demonstrations and the radicalization of requests (Cai Y, 
2008, 2010).  
Forecasts were gloomy: the prevalence and expansion of the crisis was uncertain, 
reflected also in bottomed consumer confidence by the end of 2008 and inflation of food 
prices (World bank, 2009)
4
 and business confidence at the end of 2008 reached the lowest rate 
during the last eight year (China.org.cn, 2009)
5
. So were the chances of recovery and its 
impact on party legitimacy, strictly and institutionally interwined with the economy (Csanádi, 
2006; Bukley, 2009; Cai and Chan, 2009; Demick, 2008; Chan, 2010; Kong at al, 2009; Meng 
at al, 2010; Wong, S., 2008; Charter 2008; Chen N.; 2009, Yu 2009). However, uncertainty 
                                                 
4
 World Bank, Quarterly update, June, 2009  http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/06/18/000333037_2
0090618234810/Rendered/PDF/489910NEWS0P1110June020090quarterly.pdf  
5
 Business confidence index pointer to recovery China.org.cn 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2009-07/10/content_18106881.htm 
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soon withered away. The dramatic set-back was short-lived. From the second quarter of 2009 
foreign trade boomed again (Figure 1 and Table 1): in 2010 export grew by 31.0 percent from 
-16.9 percent and 20.3 in 2011, the import to 38.8 percent from – 11.2 percent and further 
24.9 in 2011.  GDP growth was slower compared to export growth but also accelerated to 
10.4 by 2010, while the pace of gross industrial output also substantially increased in 2010 
after a dramatic slow down to 8 percent in 2009. Already by mid 2009 the unemployment rate 
among migrants dropped to 3 percent compared to the 16 percent of the previous two 
quarters’ (Cai and Chan, 2009, 521) and by 2010, the growthrate of migrant employment rose 
to 5.53 percent from 3.5 percent of the previous year.
6
  
What is behind the fast recovery? How can we explain the success of the economic 
policy to regenerate economic growth despite the persistence of the global crisis, and despite 
the export-, regional- and political sensitivity of the Chinese economy and the growing 
tensions in the society?  
 
A Promt State Intervention: The Introduction of a Stimulus Package   
 
The set-back prompted the central and local government to immediately introduce regulations 
that would compensate losses and stimulate growth. However, the stimulus package 
introduced in November 2008 and supporting fiscal policy strongly exceeded the importance 
of those instruments (Schmidt and Heilmann 2010). The original amount of the stimulus 
package was planned to 4 trillion yuan for 2008-2010, about 13 percent of the 2008 GDP 
(Table 2), half of the ratio of export in the same.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 China Development Report, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm. 
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Name Billion Yuan % 
Public infrastructure 1,500 38 
Post-earthquakee 
econstruction 
1,000 25 
Sustainable development 210 5 
Rural development 370 9 
Technology advancement 370 9 
Social welfare 400 10 
Educational projects 150 4 
 
Table 2 Break-down of the four trillion yuan Stimulus Package 
Source:Compiled from Economic Observer On-line China's Stimulus Package: A Breakdown 
of Spending http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance_investment/2009/03/07/131626.shtml 
 
The main goal of the stimulus plan was to drift production away from export orientation, by 
shifting regional and sectoral and trade focus, enterprise scale and ownership characteristics. 
Thus, it preferred investments in central and western regions, the origin of 80 percent of 
migrants (Small census, 2005 NBS), on domestic field, in construction sector, large and state 
owned enterprises rather than export oriented manufacturing sector in the coastal regions 
produced by private small- and middle sized enterprises overwhelmingly foreign owned (Liu, 
2009). 
Promt government reaction is reflected in the increased growth pace of overall investments 
already in 2008 (Table 3). Judging from CEIC World Bank estimates on state and private 
investments, the ownership priorities of the stimulus package were evident in the steep growth 
of governments’ investment in fixed assets, compared to the decline of private investments in 
2009 (World Bank, 2009, Fig. 2).  
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Figure 3 Dynamics of loans and investments in fixed assets during crisis and stimulus  
Source: Michigan University China Data Center http://chinadataonline.org/ 
 
The announced package appointed nine sub-sectors to be supported in the 
manufacturing industry: light industry, textile industry, steel industry, other metal industry, 
car industry petrochemical industry, ship building, elctronics and telecommunication 
(xinhuanet, 2008;). Still, two-thirds of the investments was focused on infrastructure building, 
including post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction, subsidised housing and public 
infrastructure (Table 2). Most of the loans were made to finance infrastructure projects under 
the control of local government urban development and infrastructure corporations (OECD 
2009, 236).  
Sectoral investment priorities on construction were clearly reflected in the sectoral 
investment data, where the pace of investment in construction increased in 2009 and so did 
the reacting boom of loans in the same year (Table 3). Meanwhile, the investment growth 
pace in the manufacturing sector, where the crisis hit the most, continuously slowed since 
2007. The dynamics of foreign direct investment reflects the global consequences of the 
crisis, even shrinking in 2009.  
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Investment y/y 32.1 40.6 26.0 20.2 
Inv. manuf. y/y 30.6 27.4 24.5 25.5 
Inv. constr.y/y 16.5 20.2 45.1 29.1 
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Loans y/y 46.5 28.1 102.6 1.7 
FDI y/y 18.6 23.6 -2.6 17.4 
 
Table 3 Dynamics of Investment and loans between 2007 and 2010 (y/y) 
Source: Investment (Total investment in fixed assets, RMB): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 
5-7 inv. manuf, inv. constr (RMB): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 5-7; loans (RMB): “Social 
Financing” from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 19-11; FDI (Foreign Direct Investment 
Actually Utilized, USD): China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Table 17-15; 2009, Table 17-15; 2010, 
Table 6-14; 2011, Table 6-14; 2012, Table 6-14  
 
China Statistical Yearbooks, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
China’s institutional structure and budgetary financing tasks are strongly decentralized. The 
overwelming majority of public commitments, including infrastructue building are delegated 
to the level of local governments. Thus, sectoral priorities of the stimulus project and the 
decentralized nature of institutional responsibilities in China directed the financing of 
investment expenditures and loans towards local activity. This was reflected in the planned 
division of resources of the package among central and local levels. Accordingly, despite the 
central initiative, only one third of the planned investments were to be covered from central 
budget between 2008 and 2010, the remaining two-thirds were to be provided by local 
governments (31 percent), and local enterprises and banks (40 percent) (World Bank, INFRA, 
2010).  
Besides the so-far analyzed priorities of the stimulus package to decrease export 
reliance by spuring the expansion of state ownership, domestic large enterprises, 
infrastructure building and with those the investment activity of local governments, we can 
trace strongly accentuated regional preferences towards central and western regions.  
 
 
Spatial Disparities of Adaptation   
National level characteristics of growth (Table 1 and Table 3) were not homogeneously 
reflected in space. Instead, spatial clusters of different dynamics may be perceived partly due 
to the impact of incentives and regulations before the crisis and to the impact of economic 
policy after the crisis as well as to the deterioration and slow rebound of foreign trade.  
Spatial differences become even more accentuated if we take the paces of the 
skyrocketing regional dynamics of invesmtnets in the manufacturing and construction sectors. 
(Maps 2/a and 2/b). During the researched period 65 percent of the provinces in 
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manufacturing, and 77 percent of those in construction were concentrated in the intervals with 
higher than 50 percent and over 100 percent of growth pace . Highest rates in both sectors are 
found in the central and western regions. Highest pace investment provinces are more 
concentrated in construction and outnumber those in manufacturing. However, acceleration 
after 2009 is perceived only in manufacturing, visible also at coastal region, suggesting its 
surge from the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
Map 2/a 
 
Map 2/b 
Spatial dynamics of investments in 
construction by provinces between 
2008-2010 
Spatial dynamics of investments in 
manufacturing by provinces between  
2008-2010 
 
 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for investments in infrastructure 
and manufacturing. Little circles within provinces are signs of acceleration in growth-
rate after 2009   
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 5-7; 2010, Table 5-7; 2011, Table 5-7 
 
 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
High investment dynamics in both sectors is not only reflected in the explosive 102.6 percent 
increase of loans in 2009 (Table 3) but also in its dramatic regional impact compared to the 
period before the crisis. On Map 3/b radical changes may be perceived in the regional 
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distribution of credit growth in 2008-2010 compared to 2005-2007, despite widespread 
regional acceleration of credit growth during the earlier period (Map 3/a). The highest 
regional level growth during the whole period of 2008-2010 surpassed those of the previous 
period by two intervals. Map 3/b shows that besides the credit increase having spread almost 
overall, the highest growth is demonstrated at provinces located at central and western 
regions.  
 
Map 3/a Map 3/b 
Spatial dynamics of loans from financial 
institutions by provinces between 2005-2007 
Spatial dynamics of loans from financial 
institutions by provinces between 2008-2010 
  
Note: The colours show the different speed of growth for loans. Little circles within 
provinces are signs of acceleration in growth-rate after 2006 and 2009   
Source: Compiled from NBS data, Michigan University China Data Center   
http://chinadataonline.org/ 
 
At the same time, we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that even the lowest rate intervals on 
the maps rarely demonstrated stagnation or setback in the researched period. Based on the 
above indicators and their rate and acceleration we suggest that the successful realization of 
the package priorities directly contributed to the overheating of the Chinese economy and to 
its regionally differring manifestation.  
 
Labor Market Impact of the Crisis and the Stimulus Package 
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According to the research report of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) in China the stimulus package had remarkable labor market impact. Investments 
created 5.6 million permanent jobs and 50 million temporary workplaces (Blomberg 2010, 
June 15). During the researched period the estimated number of migrants  increased by almost 
20 million: from 140.41 million in 2008 to 158.63 million in 2011 (NMS 2012). Regional and 
sectoral priorities of foreign and domestic investments have restructured the regional direction 
of migrant flow, shortening migration distances: in 2009 the number of migrants from all 
regions whose destination were the eastern provinces declined 8.9 percent in the east while 
the ratio and number of those heading to the center and west increased 34.6 percent (Csanádi, 
Nie, Lishi, 2013; Xu, Y, 2010, 2; Knight, John, Deng Quheng and Li Shi 2010). The same 
move was reinforced by the drastic decline of export production and enterprise close-downs in 
the east. Indirect data on the change of the regional and prefecture level distribution of high 
level and growing GDP per capita towards central and western region reflect the above 
increased but restructured migrant concentration in large cities (Maps 4/a and 4/b). 
Map 4/a 
Economic production and growth 2000-
2005 
 
Map 4/b 
Economic production and growth 2006-
2010 
 
 
By 2011, overall more migrants became employed within the province of their home-town 
compared to those who left to other provinces than in 2008 (Csanádi, Nie and Li 2013).  The 
tension between catching up labor demand owing to positive market and export structure 
developments in the east  and the attraction of the stimulus package in the western and central 
regions improved migrants’ working conditions, narrowed migrants’ regional income 
disparities and increased education level both in general and among new migrant generation 
(Csanádi, Nie, LiShi 2013). 
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We have traced the national, sectoral and regional impact of the stimulus package in 
investments, loans and migration routes. However, the priorities of the stimulus package had 
characteristic consequences also on local dynamics.  Next we shall focus on the direct impact 
of state intervention on the institutional structure and its systemic background 
 
National and local development processes of the stimulus package 
Decentralized Commitments and Its Financial Premises  
This was not the first, neither the last time for similar priorities of stimulating state 
interventions in China in the event of an external shock. For example, the 10th Five Year Plan 
(2001-2005) also strongly emphacised the importance of urbanization and infrastructure 
building.  Goals were directly influeced by the Asian financial crisis by the end of 1990s that 
caused serious economic set-backs in South- Korea, Singapur, Taiwan, Malaizia and 
Indonezia. Focus points of the plan served to prevent the crisis to spread in China. The 
stimulus package announced in late 2008 was also an instrument of adaptation to external 
shock, similar to the reactions to the Asian crisis.  
Investment financing, however differed from the methods used during the Asian crisis. 
During the period of the Asian crisis overwhelmingly government resources were deployed 
and distributed through policy banks. From 2003 onwards and specificly regarding the 2008 
stimulus package, major role was attributed to four specialized state banks 
(Industrial&Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, 
Agricultural Bank of China) and to the loans provided by them (IMF 2011, 12-13).  
In other respect, the one-off state intervention did not imply new institutions. Procedures of 
investment authorization connected to the stimulus package ran through the routine 
institutional routes and decision-making mechanisms. Stimulus package did not have distinct 
statistical monitoring either. According to routine procedure the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible for the formulation of the national development 
plan and the approval of the projects to be supported. As soon as the NDRC approved a 
project this latter was eligible for receiving budgetary support and bank loans. NDRC 
approval is required above a certain value of a given project.  
Financial expectations facing local governments who initiated three quarters of the 
allowed development projects were substantially higher than during the Asian crisis. To get 
the project accepted, enterprises had to offer financial guarantee for their own contribution 
both in case of central budgetary support and connected bank loans. Size of the contribution 
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was regularly the 25-35 percent of the project costs. For the sake of fast fulfillment of the 
projects the NDRC generally chose local government projects that had sufficient own 
resources to meet co-financing criteria (Wong 2011a, 61). While China’s Budget Law 
(yusuanfa) and Guarantee Law (danbaofa) prohibit local governments from running deficits 
that are financed by debt or to serve as guarantors for local projects,
7
  central policy measures 
were taken to ease the provision of own resources. State Council decided over the release of a 
200 billion Rmb state bond package by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of local 
governments (Xu, W., 2009; Na, 2011) for whom bond issue was centrally forbidden. Income 
from those bonds was quickly forwarded to provincial budgets. The main goal was to 
centrally secure the financial background required for budgetary supports and loans. Also 
enterprises owned by local governments (investment vehicles) could issue bonds with top tier 
credit ratings since they are guaranteed by local governments. that would serve for investment 
source (Rabinovich, 2013). But not only bonds ensured financing preconditions but also land 
and buildings to be built on the lands served as collateral. Land use practice as collateral 
benefitted from the extremely complicated land management system.  
 
Land management System as the Local Instrument of Financial Guarantee  
Land law enacted in 2003 deals in detail with the unalienability of the 47 percent of 
collectively owned rural land and of the 53 percent urban state owned land by its tenant. It 
regulates land management rights, possibilities for the expropriation of collective land by the 
government in case of public interest in exchange of proper compensation of the tenant. It 
disposes of the protection of cultivated land, of the conditions of provincial or higher level 
authorization of collective land expropriations, commercialization of land management rights 
in case of non-agricultural land, sharing ratio of land reallocation prices between local 
                                                 
7
 The prohibition of issuing local bonds: Budget Law of the People's Republic of China – 
1994, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/banking/budget-law-
of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1994.html, Article 28; The prohibition of state owned and 
collectively owned land as morgage: Guarnatee Law of the People’s Republic of China 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/glotproc373/, Article 37 
17 
 
government who allowed the transfer and the central government.
8
  Neither real estate for 
building is alienable by its user but state can expropriate the land and commercialize its use. 
Land owned by the village collective should first be nationalized by a higher level 
government and only after circulate land use rights (contractual management rights).  
Until 2006, circulation of land use rights were based on arrangement among interested 
parties that allowed local governments to sell the land management rights for industrial, 
commercial and construction ends at low prices in exchange of corruption money. The other 
method is holding tenders or auctions, where real competition is taking place among potential 
investors. In those cases prices by hectare on tenders exceed manifold the outcome of those 
settled ones, both at regional or at national level and strongly differ regionally (Tsui 2011, 
Table 3).  Though average prices are the highest in the eastern provinces, the frequency of 
deals based on settled prices is higher owing to stronger local corruption interests (Tsui 2011, 
695).  
The minimum compensation fee for the actual land user is not settled in the law (Chen 
2010, 2). In practice, the possibility of government expropriation of collective farmland and 
buildings in the name of “public good”, as well as the vague criteria for compensation of the 
user open up a vast room for manipulation and corruption. According to the results of an 
official survey in 90 locations by China News Agency 20 to 80 percent of land projects are 
illegal. According to the authors, typical example is when local officials, in agreement with 
the leaders of the local collective, requalify farmland into building real-estate and in exchange 
of corruption money sells land use rights at low prices to investors and hire gansters to carry 
out forced eviction of peasants (referred by Hays 2012). The farmer, who formerly got the 
land use rights received either none, or minimal compensation in case of expropriation that 
was only a fragment of real market prices. The mean compensation that the local government 
paid to the farmers was approximately $17, 850 per acre. When it was resold by local 
authorities, mostly to commercial property developers, the mean price was $740,000 per acre 
(Michigan State University, Landesa and Renmin University 2011). Only in 2009 local 
governments acquired 2.9 billion yuan from the difference between compensation and market 
price in circulating land use rights (Page and Spegele, 2011). This was the double of the 
volume of central budgetary resources planned in the stimulus package in 2008. Factories, 
                                                 
8
 Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Contract in Rural Areas 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75300.htm 
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commercial centers, and buildings were built on 55 percent of the expropriated rural non-
agricultural land and 30 percent of arable land (Michigan State University. Landesa and 
Renmin University 2011).  
Experts estimate that since 1990, different level governments expropriated about 16.6 
million hectare of farmland for the sake of investments for public interest. According to 
Landesa every year local governments appropriate land from 4 million rural Chinese. About 
43 percent of the villages surveyed by Landesa have been subjected to such land takings over 
the past decade. Farmers involved in the survey lost their homes in the 35.9 percent of the 
cases and in 54.9 percent both their home and their land (Michigan State University, Landesa 
and Renmin University 2011).  
Corruption connected to land confiscations provoked frequent mass demonstrations. 
According to CASS data 65 percent of the mass demonstrations are realted to illegal land 
confiscations and arable land reclassification for the sake of investments of „public interest” 
building luxury appartments, roads, dams, power stations, factories, waste disposures, 
carrying out forced demolitions, or obstructing irrigation pipes (referred by Hays 2012; 
Economy 2012).  According to another report between 1994 and 2004 70 million peasants 
were subject to illegal land seizures (Hays 2012). China Construction Management and 
Property Law Research Center reported that the pace of forced expropriations is increasing. 
Based on their survey local governments’ revenue through the commercialization of land use 
rights in 2009 was equal to 219 billion dollars 43 percent higher compared to 2008. In 2010 
this value further increased by 70 percent (Hays 2012).
 
Growth of local revenues from land 
use commercialization had social response: according to official data in 2008 127 000 mass 
demonstrations were registered. From those 467 were occupation of government departments, 
615 were strikes against police and court buildings, 110 against government buildings and 
cars (Walsh 2009). In 2009, there were 110,000 demonstrations, in 2010 that figure soared, 
with reports of 280,000 “mass incidents” taking place across China. Moreover, the number of 
people involved in these demonstrations has also increased by an average of 17 percent every 
year in the past decade. In 2000, there were a total of 1.63 million demonstrators involved, but 
in 2009, 5.72 million protested.  Growing social pressure accelerated the implementation of a 
new law by China’s legislative body in 2011 which took twelve years to draft. This law limits 
the use of violence in forced evictions, as well as outlaws the clearing of property at night and 
during holidays. Under the 2011 regulation, violent law enforcement measures are to be used 
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only in "emergencies," though the term is not defined. Chinese authorities declared that the 
law would help to protect human rights (Hogg 2011). 
Evicted and requalified collective land by local government may be transferred to state 
owned enterprise use (Hu 2006, 27). Thus, potential profit from marketing land use rights 
remains off-budget, being used by local government owned enterprises (local financial 
platforms) that may use them as collateral for bank loans, though banks, by law, cannot take 
land as collateral (Jacoby, Li, and Roselle 2001, 5). 
 
Local Financial Platforms as Instruments of Local Investments  
 
After 2008, central government allowed and encouraged again earlier restricted financial 
platforms (joint document released by Peoples Bank of China and Chinese Bank Regulatory 
Commission in 2009. March 24 referred by Wong 2011a, 62-63). Restrictions then served to 
control overheating and ease inflation pressure.  However, these platforms were used by local 
governments well before easing restrictions, in order to circumvent regulations that prohibited 
the direct extension of loans to local governments.   
It was by the end of the 1980s when provincial and other local governments founded 
enterprises that took charge of pubic investments and urban development. These financially 
independent enterprises were brought to life for well defined individual goals. They were 
meant to bridge over the gap between decentralized state development functions and such 
restrictive regulations since 1994 tax reform on local government investment activity as 
higher share of centralized tax revenue, restrictions over off-budget revenues, and prohibitions 
of acquisition of additional local budgetary revenues from loans and bonds (Csanádi és Lai, 
2003), cutting down on the activity of local platforms or forbidding to use government assets 
as collateral (Chang 2010; Wei 2009).
 
  
Further stage in the development of local financial platforms, still before the Asian 
crisis in 1998, was the foundation of a local government enterprise in Shanghai with overall 
rights to manage local government assets. The wide profile of this enterprise was a real break-
through in its capacity to adapt to the market. Besides its ability to get loans it got wide 
ranging rights for local infrastructural investment and servicing duties (water supply, 
sewerage, road building), and realestate development.  Substantial part of local revenues was 
managed by the enterprise that grew large as a result of growing income from increasing land- 
and real-estate prices and revenues from commercialized land and rents. Thus, overwhelming 
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part of Shanghai’s capital development expenditures and revenues were transferred outside 
the budget (off-budget) (Wong 2011a, 62). Similar example is mentioned by Tsui regarding 
six government owned enterprises founded and developped by government resources 
(financial subsidies, land use right transfer revenue, land transfer etc) in Chongqing province 
that were registered at the stock exchange (Tsui 2011, 699). This solution spread quickly 
along local governments. Subtle variations of financial innovations came to life. Financial 
platforms allowed to include revenues in the balance sheet of local enterprises that made them 
suitable for loans and to issue bonds.
 
 
After 2008 financial crisis financial platforms played a crucial role in benefiting the 
stimulus package, using bank loans. These enterprises were completely dressed up with those 
qualities that could enhance local governments’ resource attracting capacity. Central 
government’s official acknowledgement and encouragement of their activity as financial 
platforms (Local Investment Companites LIC) of local governments provided strong impetus 
to their activity. According to a China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) report, local 
governments founded all together 8,200 such enterprises to realize investment projects 
(Chang 2010). Easing chances for resource acquisition allowed the speed up of infrastructural 
projects in process and the earlier fulfillment of local government and ministries’ middle- and 
longterm development plans, as well as those investments not in the plan but among the 
priorities of the stimulus package (Csanádi 2012).  
As a result of the above, fairly one month after the introduction of the package local 
governments already applied for 18 trillion yuan worth investment projects. Later this number 
increased to 25 trillion as opposed the 4 trillion yuan of the stimulus package (Wong 2011a, 
63).  
 
 
Consequences of State Intervention: Investment Overheating   
 
The Overheating of Local Investments  
More than half of the loans in 2009 were given for infrastructure building (World Bank, 
INFRA 2010, Table 2;). However, owing to the decentralized functions of infrastructure 
building, overwhelming part of these loans appeared at the level of local governments. They 
were received by local financial platforms, provided by local branches of large state banks 
integrated into the local power network. According to the China Banking Regulatory 
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Commission (CBRC), in 2009 financial platforms received one third of new loans thereby 
increasing their debt asset by the end of the year from 3.0 trillion RMB to 7.4 trillion RMB. 
By the end of 2010, already 40 percent of new loans were received by the group of financial 
platforms (IMF 2011, 14). Growing local indebtedness worried the highest government 
bodies: the CBRC, the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance and the Chinese National Audit Office 
(CNAO) who initiated investigations (Audit Findings on China’s Local Government Debts 
2011, 11-16)).  
According to CNAO data, local governments have accumulated 10.7 trillion RMB of 
debts that made 26.9 percent of the 2010 GDP. Local governments are directly responsible for 
62.6 of those debts, for 21.8 they have guarantee commitments and partial repayment 
obligations for 15.6 percent of the loans (URBANOMICS 2011). The CNAO judged 26 
percent of these loans of high risk in mid 2010 (GaveKal, DragonWeek 2010 November 8 ). 
According to the CBRC report 47 percent of loans received by the financial platforms was 
secured by local government budgetary guarantees, while revenue from land use rights were 
taken as general budgetary guarantee (negative pledge).   
Indebtedness problems of local governments date back to earlier periods. Similar 
processes took place during earlier state interventions.  By the time of the global crisis, locally 
amassed debts according to the CNAO exceeded the 5.5 trillion RMB (CNAO 2011), 
overwhelmingly in loans. This happened despite the fact that in 2006 the central government 
prohibited mega-loans for large state-owned enterprises (Tsui 2011, 696). Some calculations 
estimate loans received by local platforms including other hidden items to over 150 percent of 
the GDP in 2010 (The Economist, 2011). 
 
Overheating on National Level  
The real value of the stimulus package substantially exceeded originally planned volumes, 
fitting into an earlier tendency where investments grew by 32.1 percent in 2007, 40 percent in 
2008 as the promt reaction to the crisis, they further grew by 23 percent in 2009 and still 
another 20 percent by 2010 (Table 1). Moreover, investments in somewhat slower pace but 
further increased in 2011 by 17.2 despite the formal termination the stimululs program in 
2010 (NBS 2012). The pace of GDP growth was much lower than that of investments: it grew 
from 9.2 percent in 2009 to 10.4 percent in 2010 (NBS 2011). Investment in fixed assets in 
2010 was 70 percent of the GDP (Derek, 2011).  
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Behind the GDP growth and the much higher pace of the investment were the 
unexpected increase of investment sources: the originally planned amount of the stimulus 
package was quickly overfulfilled. Budgetary intervention and loans together achieved 4.8 
trillion already in 2008 that surpassed the whole sum planned for the period of the stimulus 
package. By mid 2009, central resources were increased by further 30 percent (Wong, 2011b, 
7-9), money supply was increased by 22 percent that was accompanied by an even greater 
expansion of credits (Figure 3 and Table 3). Loans constituted two thirds of the invested volume 
instead of the originally planned 40 percent (World Bank, INFRA 2010).  
Experts’ estimations regarding its share in the GDP are diverse: according to the 
World Bank debt ratio in the GDP was 30 percent (World Bank, INFRA 2010), while 
according to Wong’s estimations it was only 15 percent (Wong 2011a, 65). In 2010, official 
Chinese sources estimated local and central debts to the 45 percent of the GDP in 2010 and to 
38.5 percent of the GDP in 2011 (CIA 2012). These calculations, however, ommitted several 
factors that should have been included, thus, real share might have been much higher. CIA 
mentions that these data provided by the National Audit Office do not contain bonds issued by 
policy banks, the debts of the Ministry of Railway Transport, the debts of Asset Management 
Companies that took over debts of state owned enterprises and the bad loans. Taking into 
consideration these missing factors a fourth quarterly monetary policy report estimated the 
debts to the 74 percent of the GDP in 2010. (ALSOSPRACH 2011). 
The skyrocketing expansion of debts also increased the volume of non-performing 
loans. Direct reason emerges from the fact that managers of local branches of large state-
owned banks are integrated into the local power structure. They take the agreements settled 
with government organizations and the servicing of debts amassed by priority enterprises for 
granted. The share of  non-performing loanswas estimated to 8-12 percent of all loans in 2011 
(Fitch in BBC 2011 and Moody in URBANOMICS 2011), according to which experts 
forecasted 60 percent chance for a credit crunch by mid 2013 as a result of record volume of 
credits and burst of real-estate bubble (Wealth Daily, 2012).  
 
Measures against investment overheating  
 
Central government was alarmed by the increasing risk conditions of banks. It steadily tried to 
control credit-debit spiral since mid 2009 set free by the increased state intervention through 
the stimlus package and the decentralized functional structural specifics of the institutional 
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system. The implementation of restrictive monetary and fiscal instruments accelerated from 
early 2010: the central bank raised the discount rate by four basis points, raised reserve ratio 
and began open market operations to repurchase 30 billion RMB worth bonds in 2010.  
Central measures failed to contain overheating: credit expansion already in January 
met the size of the credit boom of the first quarter of 2009. The Monetary Committee decided 
over further credit tightening. However, as banks were forced to further tighten loans while 
the hunger for resources remained steady, the circulation of off-balance-sheet financial 
products doubled from 1.6 trillion to 3.8 trillion yuan in order to evade regulatory oversight, 
to bypass loan quotas, interest rate caps, and other restrictions. Consequently, despite focused 
efforts, expansion of loans in 2010 remained at the level of those in 2009 (GaveKal-
Dragonomics, 2011a, 2-3).   
In 2011 loans shrinked by 4.1 percent, government budgetary expenditures grew 10.8 
percent as restrictive efforts seemed to become efficient (Table 3). Decline was caused by 
cutting down trust companies’ lending as an off-balance sheet vehicle. However, meanwhile, 
designated loans, as another off-balance sheet instrument, more than doubled in the first 
quarter, with large SOEs and listed companies profiting of high interest rate lending to 
property developers whose access to bank loans has been sharply curbed in the process of 
tightening (GaveKal-Dragonomics 2011b). Consequently, central efforts to curb overheating 
had less impact on local investments and even less on off-balance sheet investments: 
investments grew by 17.2 percent in 2011, within those central investments decreased by 9.7 
percent while local investments grew further by 27.2 percent and off-balance sheet 
investments by 28.6 percent (UMICH, NBS 2012). Despite several counter measures, this 
tendency still prevails in 2013 and poses risks to the whole economy (Jingu, 2013, 5). 
According to Fitch Ratings local governments are sitting on 12.8 trillion yuan in debt. Add in 
loans from the shadow banks and the total could be closer to 18 trillion yuan. 9   
According to Moody, the official debt burden of central and local government, which 
does not take the localities’ shadow banking activities into account, is just below 30 percent 
of GDP in mid 2013. In contrast, other experts estimate that shadow banking liabilities and 
consumer, corporate, and government debt are now more than 200 percent of GDP (Business 
                                                 
9
 Though credit crunch did not occur in 2013, the pressure on central government seems to be 
high. The State Council ordered CNAO in July to inspect local government indebtedness 
throughout the whole country at all levels expected to be published by the end of the year. 
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Week, 2013, May 16). The ratio of investments in the GDP despite the economic policy 
promises and measures to increase GDP growth increased from the 40.7 percent share before 
crisis to a record hight of 46.2 percent in 2010 (NBS 2012 and NBS 2011 referred by Tsui 
2011, 705). This ratio minimally decreased in 2012 to 45.9 according to CIA estimates (CIA 
World Factbook 2012), though we also have to consider, that GDP growth itself slowed down 
from 10.4 percent in 2010 to 9.3 in 2011 and  further to 7.8 in 2012 (World Bank 2013).  
 
Systemic Background of Adaptation, Overheating and Local Indebtedness 
 
Looking at Chinese reform history, overheated investment and lending is not an accidental 
phenomena caused by global crisis but instead, a re-emerging issue.(Figure 4). Investment 
overheatings had higher and lower peaks. First, unleashed in 1992-1993 after Deng’s 
Southern tour preempted by economic set-back, the economic retrenchment and bloody 
military clamp-down of the Tiannanmen square movement, and actions intended to freeze the 
process of economic and political transformation, fuelled by the inflation and corruption and 
the domino collapse of the communist block countries. The second was a less severe 
overheating during the Asian crisis in late 1990s initiated to avoid the multiplicative influence 
of the Asian crisis, a third one after the accession to the WTO in 2002-2003 when external 
constraints suddenly softened resulting directly or indirectly in abundant resources through 
increased export or FDI; and fouth, the process of overheating after global crisis in 2009.  
Each period demonstrates that despite the substantial advancement of the market economy, 
key characteristics of the communist systems and its Chinese specifics continued to shape 
ways of adaptation Ways of adaptation depend on the nature of constraints the interacting 
external and internal pressures form and the persistence of those constraints. Not only the 
systemic features of this adaptation are revealed but also the system-specific effects of 
adaptation on economic growth. Both of them involved state intervention, though with 
different motifs that initiated overheating. Overall growth of investment booms went parallel 
to investments in construction though to different extent. 
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Figure 4. Periods of overheated investment and parallel dynamics of GDP in consruction 
Source: compiled from NBS statistics, University of Michigan China Data Center. 
chinadataonline.org 
 
Repeated phases of overheating in general and the similar development in 2009 in particular 
cannot be explained by the loss of central and local control over investments during the 
stimulus package, since institutional control over investments is tight. Projects are authorized 
by major central decision-making organization (NDRC) or its respective local bureau 
depending on the type of distributed resources (central or local) and the size of the 
investment. Similarly tight is the political control of those taking part in the decisions: 
leadership of policy and commercial state banks, SOEs and other institutions are in the 
nomenklatura (cadre responsibility) of the cadres of local or higher level party apparatuses. 
Local power in turn, is controlled politically since decades from one level above. Neither 
shortcomings of institutional incentives of economic-, government- and state bank managers 
is sufficient in itself to explain why decisions are driven towards unlimited growth and 
unlimited resource distribution just as they are (were) in other party-state systems. If this 
incentive system repeatedly causes such a big problem why don’t they introduce a different 
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one that drives decision-makers towards economic efficiency rather than volume, or why does 
it fail if intorduced?  
We argue that this is because it is system specifics rather than control, regulation 
problems or wrong incentives lie behind the institutional, functional, interest and behavioral 
phenomena of repeated overheating. Local indebtedness, investment overheating and 
motivations of decision-makers should be ascribed to the decision-making mechanism that 
derives from the general features of party-state systems and its Chinese specifics. In this 
mechanism party-, state-, and economic decision-makers are institutionally tightly interrelated 
through the power instruments of the party forming a politically monopolized network of 
dependency and interest promotion. Power instruments permeate institutional boundaries of 
non-party organizations
10
 and directly overlap the decision-making process in non-party 
organizations through the positional, activity and organizational structure and bind individuals 
through party discipline (Csanádi 2011).11  
Through the power instruments of the party a politically monopolized power network 
is constructed. Politically rational economic motivations of decision-makers integrated into 
this network evolve from its elements, connecting and operating principles of the structure are 
constructed on political purposes that are self-similar in time, space and different level of 
aggregation of the network (Csanádi 2006). Politically, rather than economically rational 
economic motivations of behavior present themselves in the priorities of resource distribution 
(priorities to large scale, state ownership, political position) and in the investment motivation 
of those applying for resources (drive for growth, drive for resources, and accumulation of 
connections (guangxi)) and structural rather than efficiency constraints influence the self-
reproduction of the network. These general system characteristics will result in selectively 
soft reproduction constraints of those prioritized by the politically rational motivations of 
distribution and will cause overheating, that owing to the self-similarities it may be revealed 
in different time, in different space and different aggregation levels.  
                                                 
10
 Non-party institutions mean all units of those subspheres that do not belong directly to the 
party apparatus, embracing trade-union, education, culture, finance, and state-owned 
enterprises (Csanádi 1997). 
11
 Thus, the network deriving from dependencies and interest promotion relationships 
includes banks overlaped by local and central party apparatuses both as an organization, as an 
activity, as leading position and as party members in those positions.  The party exerts tight 
control over the leaders of large state-owned banks, involved in selecting, appointing, 
financially motivating or demoting them (Csanádi 1997). 
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Besides the above general characteristics of party-state systems prevailing at different 
level aggregations, the relatively decentralized nature of the Chinese power network 
accentuate overheating at local levels resulting in deep indeptedness of local governments. 
Characteristic distribution of power within the Chinese party-state network developped as a 
result of Mao’s repeated decentralizing campaigns from the late 1950s on.  Decentralized 
nature of the power network means the capacity of resource extraction and allocation of local 
governments through the decentralized subordination of SOEs and other insitutions to local 
level party and state authorities as opposed to centralized subordination and extraction and 
allocation capacity of the European party-states. Decentralization provided them relative 
independence from central decisions and more resisting capacity). to central intervention.   
This structure became stable by 1978 and was further reinforced through Deng Xiao 
Ping’s decentralizing reforms (Csanádi 2006). The formal institutional appearance of the 
decentralized power structure are the local governments’ chances for taxation, selling land use 
rigths and investing and within those, the decentralized tasks of infrastructure building. Also 
important is the integration of provincial level governments and large SOEs into higher level 
party and government decision-making forums that allow for insider information, 
accumulation of connection, promotion of interest and easier resource attraction and 
resistance to, or preparation for unavoidable interventions.  
The decentralized character of the Chinese power network or other variations in the 
distribution of power in party-states (Csanádi, 2011), do not modify the general characteristics 
of the system. Instead, they prevail along the stabilized individual structure. This is the 
individual specific that becomes flagrant on the occasion of major interventions that increase 
the activity along the network (Csanádi, 2012/35). It is due to the specific distribution of the 
Chinese power network that the drive for growth, loan overload, risky loans, indebtedness and 
overheating emerged at local level, absorbing three quarters of the stimulus package. The 
same decentralized power structure is responsible for the fact that only after repeated, and 
major restrictive interventions could the central government subdue local drive for growth.  
Not only operation but also economic transformation may be defined from systemic 
point of view. Transformation means the retreat of the politically monopolized network either 
first from the political sub-field or from the economic subfield. In case of China, economic 
transformation is taking place first as opposed to its European counterparts by the end of 
1980s. The retreat of the network from politically monopolized economic sub-sphere means 
the transformation of the economic subspere towards the market system. Retreat may be 
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absolute or relative, no matter which subfield is transforming first. Relative retreat of the 
network from economic subfield means the higher pace of expansion of the private sphere 
compared to that of the network sphere. It evolves through the increasing number of new 
private ventures, privatized enterprises, price liberalization, marketized agriculture, dual-track 
prices etc. Absolute retreat of the network means the different modes of waning of the 
network connected to the economic subsphere. This process takes place through the transfer 
of competitive capital, economic units or activities outside the network (emptying the 
network), through privatization or close-downs (cutting off the network), through squeezing 
distributive functions at lower levels (withdrawing the network), through the infiltration of 
alternative capital and organizations entering the network (thereby weakening the influence 
exerted through it), parallel to the expansion of the private field (Csanádi 2011).  
However, within the realms of the absolutely or relatively retreating network 
motivation of decisions follows unchanged rules and selection mechanisms. Moreover, major 
state intervention and new chances for resource acquisition will mobilize the network and 
activate its characteristics of operation and distribution. Economically rational goals within 
the network are invariably realized according to politically rational motivations where 
priorities of resource distribution accomodate to state ownership, size of economic units, 
political positions and accumulation of connections of their leaders. This is why the winners 
of the stimulus package were domestic, mostly state-owned enterprises whose investments 
grew by 40.6 percent between 2008 and 2011 (Luk’yanenko 2011).12  Same system specifics 
motivate banks in the distribution of loans and in being involved in risky loans and engage in 
shadow banking (Roberts, 2013; Perkins, 2013). This is the reason why the central 
government took over the bad debts of larger state- owned enterprises and those of local 
governments.  
 In this system resource distribution, drive for growth and for hoarding resources have 
no efficiency constraints, instead structural constraints of power distribution within the 
network determine the hardness or softness of resource extraction and distribution. Structural 
constraints mean the distribution of bargaining capacities of actors integrated into the network 
                                                 
12
 “State enterprises enjoy extensive privileges: they have special access to sources of credit, a 
strong bargaining position over industrial prices and the right to make legislative proposals; 
they are not obliged to share profits and often enjoy lower taxation levels. Given these 
privileges, it is not clear to what extent they are really profitable ...” (Kundnani, 2010, 5)   
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dressed up with unequal resource attracting, resource extracting, resource distributing 
capacities and resisting capacity to interventions, together providing their different constraints 
in self-reproduction. Different distributions of bargaining capacities will provide the 
distribution of power in the network and determine the whole network’s capacity and 
constraints for self-reproduction in a given period. If structural constraints become soft, as 
they were during the stimulus package through state intervention, characteristic motivations 
of resource distribution and hoarding will quickly overheat the economy as they did within 
one year from the 2008 crisis shock.  
The general economic factors of overheating and overcapacity and its repeated periods 
in China are defined by Yu Yongdin in his paper dealing with the Chinese stimulus package 
(Yu, 2009, p. 3-5). Overheated and cyclical character of communist systems was revealed by 
Tamás Bauer (Bauer,  1978,1981,  1986) for the period of the 1950s and Károly Attila Soós 
for the period of the 1980s (Soós,  1976,  1986,  1987,  1989).  Their analysis for Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s, confronted by similarly repeated 
phenomena in China earlier and in 2011-2012 support that the overheating is a system 
characteristic independent of time and space.  
The inter-connectedness of system characteristics, individual specifics and the 
transformation of the Chinese party-state system is also palpable. Interventions work 
according to systemic priorities: expand the network through the prioritized growth of those 
integrated into it, thereby temporary halting or slowing down transformation. On the other 
hand, the amplitude of overheating is increased by the the private sphere activated by the 
input demand of prioritized economy that incites the expansion of the private sphere outside 
the network, accelerating transformation. This process is spatially detectable both in the case 
of construction or in manufacturing if we compare the output of units integrated into the 
network and units integrated into the market sphere, and view its expansion according to 
prioritized spatial focus of the stimulus package (Maps 4/a and 4/b and Maps 5/a and 5/b) 
 
Map 4/a Map4/b 
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Expansion of output in the network in 
manufacturing sector in 2009 
Expansion of output in the activated private 
sphere in manufacturing sector in 2009 
  
Source: Source: State-owned: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 13-8; 2010, Table 14-
8; Private: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 13-12; 2010, Table 14-12 
 
 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
 
 
Map 5/a 
 
 
Map 5/b 
Expansion of output in the network in 
construction sector in 2009 
Expansion of output in the activated private 
sphere in construction sector in 2009 
  
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for network and market fields in 
construction and manufacturing.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 14-16; 2010, Table 15-16; 2011, Table 5-6 
 
 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
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Maps reveal the characteristics of the transforming economic system in the Chinese party-
state in prioritized regions, in both construction sector and in manufacturing sector mobilized 
by the imput demands of construction sector, by the designated manufacturing industries in 
the stimulus package and by the recuperating export production. Private sphere promptly 
reacted to the input demands of the prioritized economic units in the network sphere, thereby 
increasing the amplitude of overheating. Distribution of loans in 2010 and 2011 according to 
enterprise size and ownership clearly show distribution priorities towards large state owned 
enterprises integrated into the network. At the same time it reflects the increasing share of 
medium and small enterprises, and within those the radical growth of the share of privately 
owned medium and small enterprises (Tables 4, 5 and 6).  
 
2010 Large Medium Small Total 2011 Large Medium Small Total 
Summa 
loans 43,4 32,6 24,0 100,0 
Summa 
loans 39,6 30,7 29,7 100,0 
SOE 59,5 27,2 13,3 100,0 SOE 57,0 25,1 18,0 100,0 
Collective 41,9 37,2 20,9 100,0 Collective 39,0 34,4 26,6 100,0 
Private 16,4 38,3 45,3 100,0 Private 14,4 35,9 49,7 100,0 
HK-M-T 38,8 43,3 17,9 100,0 HK-M-T 37,0 40,5 22,5 100,0 
Foreign 44,8 38,1 17,2 100,0 Foreign 41,2 37,2 21,5 100,0 
 
Table 4 The share of loan distribution according to ownership in 2010 and 2011 
Source: Compiled by the author from Almanach of China’s Finance and Banking Magazine, 
Beijing, 2011, 303; 2012, 369  
 
 
 
2010 Large Medium Small 2011 Large Medium Small 
Summa 
loans 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Summa 
loans 100,0 100,0 100,0 
SOE 71,6 43,6 29,0 SOE 70,3 39,9 29,5 
Collective 9,0 10,7 8,2 Collective 9,9 11,2 8,9 
Private 11,4 35,4 56,7 Private 12,2 39,2 55,9 
HK-M-T 3,6 5,3 3,0 HK-M-T 3,5 5,0 2,9 
Foreign 4,4 5,0 3,1 Foreign 4,1 4,7 2,8 
 
Table 5 Share of loan distribution according to enterprise size in 2010 and 2011 
Source: Compiled by the author from Almanach of China’s Finance and Banking 
Magazine, Beijing, 2011, 303; 2012, 369  
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Change 2010-11 Large Medium Small Total 
Summa loans 5,3 9,0 43,2 15,6 
SOE 3,5 -0,3 45,3 8,0 
Collective 14,7 13,8 56,0 23,0 
Private 12,9 20,7 41,2 28,7 
HK-M-T 4,9 2,8 37,7 9,9 
Foreign -3,2 2,7 31,6 5,0 
 
Table 6 Change of loan distribution according to ownership and enterprise size from 
2010 to 2011 
Source: Compiled by the author from Almanach of China’s Finance and Banking Magazine, 
Beijing, 2011, 303; 2012, 369  
 
These tendencies are supposedly reinforced by the distribution of resources of different types 
of financial institutions, other than state banks and different financial instruments other than 
loans less attained by restrictive state control. According to a Peoples Bank of China (PoBC) 
internal research report, shadow banking instruments include commercial banks off-balance-
sheet wealth management products (investment products), pooled wealth management 
products managed by securities firms, separate account wealth management products, 
securities investment funds, variable annuity investment accounts, industrial investment 
funds, venture capital investment funds, private equity funds, corporate pension plans, 
housing savings accounts, consumer finance companies, and non-bank leasing companies 
(Century Weekly, October 22, 2012, referred by Jingu, 2012) 
 
Conclusions 
The global economic crisis bursting in late 2008 exerted dramatic impact on the Chinese 
economy. For a short while, the threat of political and economic destabilization emerged. 
However, the Chinese economic policy promptly adapted to the external shock. Besides usual 
state regulations it mobilized huge budgetary and bank resources to stimulate the economy. In 
order to relieve strong export reliance the stimulus package focused on central and western 
regions instead of export-oriented coastal provinces. Rather than stimulating the export 
oriented manufacturing sector it prioritized infrastructure building. Instead of supporting 
export oriented small and medium sized foreign private enterprises it privileged large 
domestic state owned enterprises. 
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China’s crisis management between 2008 and 2011 proved to be successful. The 
national and local level responses to the global crisis met the original goals of compensating 
economic decline and decreasing export reliance. Different level governments and banks 
became promptly active, investments accelerated, economic indicators quickly improved, and 
unemployment rate soon dropped to the pre-crisis level. Infrastructural investments at central 
and western regions skyrocketed, attracting similar growth pace in manufacturing sector; 
moreover, demands of preferred state owned enterprises’ investments and input demands in 
prioritized fields activated the market field as well.  
However, stimulating state intervention initiated by the Chinese government turned 
into overheating; budgetary expenditures increased in enormous pace; legal and illegal land-
confiscations and land-use sales grew unlimited; advancement of local bank lending kept 
steady; bad loans quickly re-emerged; growth of local governments’ indebtedness through 
fiscal vehicles was incontrollable; shadow banking widely spread; bubbles developed in 
production and infrastructure building requiring new, restrictive intervention.  
Behind overheating systemic explanations are found both on national and local levels. 
We argue that though the transformation of the Chinese economy advanced substantially 
towards the market, state intervention activates the characteristics of party-state systems and 
their Chinese specifics. On the one hand, general system characteristics will define in time, 
space and different levels of aggregation, the system-specific distribution of resources to 
large, state-owned and politically integrated entities. On the other hand, these same 
characteristics will stimulate the drive for growth and for integration through the 
accumulation of political and social capital and government connections to meet selection 
priorities.  
These characteristics will catalyze the translation of economically rational goals into 
politically rational criteria of distribution and similar motivations in investment behavior of 
actors and institutions both at national and local levels. Politically rational behavior with no 
economic efficiency constraints will lead to overheated economy. The individual 
characteristics of the network will define the locations of overheating: in the Chinese case, 
overheating not only emerges at central, but overwhelmingly at local levels. It will manifest in 
uncontrollable land transfers, overexpanding loans and other resources, budgetary over-
commitments, unlimited investment activity of local financial vehicles resulting in local 
investment overheating and local indeptedness.  
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Priorities of state intervention will temporary expand the network through the faster 
growth and investments of integrated economic units at the detriment of those in the private 
sector, temporary slowing down the transformation process towards market economy. 
However, private sector activity will soon „top up” the overheating while responding to the 
input demands of prioritized economy born on politically rational motivation. At the same 
time, adaptation of the private sphere accelerates the expansion of the market sphere, thereby 
reinforcing the transformation process while adapting to the lack of efficiency constraints.  
All in all, three systemic factors contribute  to repeated overheating and local 
indebtetness in China:  (1) the consequences of politically rational motivations of economic 
behavior as a general characteristic of party-state systems that are prone to overheating. These 
characteristics will catalyze the translation of economically rational goals into politically 
rational criteria of distribution and similar motivations in investment behavior of actors and 
institutions, both at national and local levels; (2) the decentralized  character of  the Chinese 
party-state network that locates  the focus of overheating and  indeptedness;  and (3) the 
Chinese specifics of system transformation that increase the amplitude of overheating through 
the adaptation of market entities to the input demands of those prioritized by the selective 
distribution of resources. Amplified overheating and local indebtedness trigger new, 
restrictive state intervention. 
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